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Abstract—SCADA systems monitor and control critical 
infrastructures of national importance such as power generation 
and distribution, water supply, transportation networks, and 
manufacturing facilities. The pervasiveness, miniaturisations and 
declining costs of internet connectivity have transformed these 
systems from strictly isolated to highly interconnected networks. 
The connectivity provides immense benefits such as reliability, 
scalability and remote connectivity, but at the same time exposes 
an otherwise isolated and secure system, to global cyber security 
threats. This inevitable transformation to highly connected 
systems thus necessitates effective security safeguards to be in 
place as any compromise or downtime of SCADA systems can 
have severe economic, safety and security ramifications. One way 
to ensure vital asset protection is to adopt a viewpoint similar to 
an attacker to determine weaknesses and loopholes in defences. 
Such mind sets help to identify and fix potential breaches before 
their exploitation. This paper surveys tools and techniques to 
uncover SCADA system vulnerabilities. A comprehensive review 
of the selected approaches is provided along with their 
applicability. 
 
Index Terms— cyber defence, anomaly detection, attack tools, 
vulnerability, simulation, modelling, SCADA. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
UPERVISORY Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems are used to monitor and control critical national 
infrastructures such as smart grids, oil and gas, power 
generation and transmission, manufacturing, and 
transportation networks. They are also used to manage public 
utilities like buildings control, water, sewage, and traffic 
lights. The downtime or compromise of these systems can 
have disastrous consequences for the economy, public health 
and national security.  
SCADA systems (Figure 1) are cyber physical systems with 
communication networks (wired and wireless) interfacing the 
monitoring and control system with the hardware and 
providing a large attack surface [1]. The architecture can be 
envisaged as four layers as shown in Fig 1. At the lowest 
level, field or slave devices (sensors, pumps, motors) provide 
an interface for control and monitoring of the physical 
process. At the next higher level, Remote Terminal Unit 
(RTU) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) aggregate 
control (acting as master) for many field devices by passing 
commands and responses through the communications 
network to the SCADA server. PLC is a computer system 
running Ladder Logic for decision making to control the field 




Fig. 1. A simplified layered architecture for typical SCADA system.  
Human-machine Interface (HMI) and controls the process by 
activating commands as required [2]. A typical SCADA 
system could have multiple supervisory systems, PLCs, RTUs, 
HMIs, process and control instrumentation, sensors and 
actuator devices over a large geographical area, interconnected 
through a communications network. 
The use and applications of SCADA systems has increased 
as a result of rising levels of industrial process automation, 
reduced cost of operation and growth in global economies. 
Growth is expected to increase in the use of SCADA systems 
and the investment is expected to reach up to $ 11.16 billion 
by 2020 [3]. With the proliferation of the Internet of Things 
(IoT), SCADA sensor and actuator devices which are Internet 
connected SCADA systems are being transformed from a 
traditional on-site, stand-alone system to an Internet-connected 
remotely accessible system. An overview of challenges and 
security requirements for IoT is provided in [4]. A significant 
obstacle in IoT adoption is security aspects as it would be an 
attractive target for hackers [4], [5].  
There are many benefits of Internet access including 
scalability, better communications protocols, efficiency, cost 
effectiveness, interoperability between components [6] and 
remote access, but SCADA systems were never designed with 
network connectivity and security [5], [7] in mind. The focus 
had always been on reliability rather than security, and 
protection had been ensured through isolation and obscurity 
[8], [9] by using proprietary standards. Since the 1990s the 
control systems are being integrated with computer networks 
[10] and also more and more Commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) products are being used in SCADA systems [11]. 
SCADA server and user interfaces are now accessible over the 
Internet and cellular networks, providing many entry points 
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for an attacker [8], [12]. Most SCADA communications 
protocols are just plain-text [13], [14] with no message 
authentication [15] making it easier for a man-in-the-middle 
(MITM) attack. TCP/IP protocols have their own 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited [5]. PLCs would treat 
code as legitimate as long as it has the correct syntax [16]. The 
threat landscape for SCADA systems has been broadened [8] 
by Internet and cellular network connectivity, bringing along 
open standards such as web technologies, which have known 
security loopholes making it very easy for an attacker to gain 
an in-depth knowledge of SCADA networks [17], [18]. The 
modern SCADA communications use a variety of 
communication media, such as WiFi, cellular, and Bluetooth. 
Vulnerabilities in the communications protocols have been the 
main focus and target of cyber attacks. Failure to protect the 
SCADA infrastructure against the evolving threats of the 
changed connectivity landscape can have disastrous 
consequences. In the prevailing cyber security global 
environment, it is not a matter of if an attack of catastrophic 
proportion would happen, but rather when.  
A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack on a website can render a 
service unavailable, but similar attacks on SCADA systems 
can have potentially disastrous consequences [19] because of 
the fallout of the controlled process getting out of control. 
Stuxnet [16], June 2010, was the first malware designed to 
attack control systems and was the first attack of its kind that 
brought SCADA security vulnerabilities to prominence [19]. 
Prior to that although vulnerable, SCADA systems were not 
considered to be actively targeted. Malware, such as Flame 
(2012) that copied data, recorded Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP) audio and intercepted network traffic [19]. Stuxnet 
(2010) and Duqu (2011) used USB devices to spread and 
attacked the PLCs by changing the Ladder Logic code [19]. 
Havex (2014) can reportedly infect the software downloads 
from the SCADA manufacturers’ web sites [20]. An active 
group of attackers, Dragonfly [21], mainly target energy 
sectors through malware tools and infect targeted 
organisations using spam emails. These malware attacks 
highlight security weaknesses in SCADA system design [22]. 
Other attacks like Slammer at Davis-Besse nuclear plant [10] 
negate the illusion of security. The cyber attacks on SCADA 
systems have seen a 100% increase [23]. General technology 
awareness, widespread availability of free information, and the 
current global security situation of state and non-state elements 
with malicious intent, all combine to make launching such 
attacks easier and probable.  
Countering the cyber attack is an emergent need to provide 
adequate safeguards against the cyber attacks by strengthening 
the defence. The general cyber security safeguards such as 
restricted physical access, cryptography, patch management, 
separation of corporate and production systems (through 
Demilitarized Zones (DMZ), Firewalls and Access Control 
Lists (ACLs)), and activity logging are all applicable (Figure 
2) but need to be viewed in conjunction with typical SCADA 
systems characteristics. Nonetheless these security measures 
are important as the corporate network could be the entry 
point for launching an attack on the SCADA network. Most of 
these security measures are not capable of defending SCADA 
systems from attacks against SCADA protocols [24]. For 
instance, SCADA characteristics make it difficult to apply 
existing cryptographic techniques, due to limited 
computational capability, low data rate, and the need for real-
time response [17]. The confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (CIA) triad [25], applies to SCADA systems but 
with a changed order of priority as Availability, integrity and 
confidentiality (AIC), with availability being the most 
important. Agencies such as the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), USA and European 
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), provide 
best practice documents for cyber security for SCADA 
systems in particular. Protection for telework devices is 
described in [26], Cyber security of SCADA systems in [27]. 
Guidelines for Patch management are provided in [28].  
Protecting Industrial Control Systems (ICS) [2] has 
recommendations for Europe and member states, which 
identifies security challenges and recommends a common test 
bed for security testing. North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) has released Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) documents. The industry regulations have 
started mandating the cyber security safeguards and this trend 
is likely to increase in the future. 
 Investigating the effect of an attack on an actual system is 
neither recommended due to the unintended consequences, nor 
feasible on a replicated system due to the cost and effort 
involved. Analysis methods and tools are very important to 
secure such systems [29].  Therefore SCADA cyber security 
researchers mostly rely on developments of simulation 
software and hardware to model SCADA attacks to analyse 
the system security. SCADA system security can be assessed 
by using vulnerability analysis through actively attacking a 




Fig. 2. DMZ with separation of trust zones. 
used to determine the system failure response, which helps to 
understand the system and provide necessary safeguards by 
fixing the vulnerabilities. Techniques such as penetration 
testing and vulnerability analysis can be considered inclusive 
in vulnerability assessment [30].  
Generic Simulators for SCADA systems are described in 
[31] but the focus is not on cyber security. Smart Grid 
simulators [32] provide a useful reference for simulation tools 
but do not address SCADA or cyber security. Vulnerability 
assessment and analysis comprises of a spectrum of 
techniques from the simplest ones doing port scanning to those 
involving exploitation of vulnerabilities, as in an actual attack 
[27].  
This paper provides a comprehensive survey of simulation, 
modelling and related techniques helpful for assessing the 
cyber-attack vulnerabilities of SCADA systems. In this paper 
we aim to cover the array of techniques for assessing SCADA 
vulnerabilities under simulation, modelling, tools and 
techniques as these are often employed by researchers for 
SCADA cyber security. This categorisation is purely with a 
view to better organise the research literature rather than a 
taxonomy. We also highlight recent technology innovations 
which can aid in minimizing the effect of cyber security risks.  
The rest of the paper is organized into the following 
sections. Section II provides SCADA systems’ characteristics 
and vulnerabilities. Section III covers the simulation and 
modelling techniques for identifying security weaknesses. 
Section IV describes other tools and techniques for evaluating 
defence. Section V provides conclusions, and Section VI 
discusses future research directions.  
II. SCADA SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS AND 
VULNERABILITIES 
SCADA system (Figure 1) differs in characteristics from a 
conventional information technology (IT) system [8], [27]. 
SCADA systems have tighter constraints on reliability, latency 
and uptime that preclude some IT security measures [15]. 
SCADA are cyber physical systems, that is, cyber system 
(control and communications) and physical system (sensors, 
actuators) comprising a system of systems, interact as a 
cohesive and unified whole. The software commands manifest 
actions to modify physical processes.  It is important to 
consider these differences when devising the protection 
strategies.  
A. Generic OS 
SCADA systems run over conventional operating systems 
(OS), thus inheriting vulnerabilities which can compromise 
the SCADA system [10]. The vulnerabilities of the operating 
systems are periodically announced by the vendors [33]. The 
patches are normally issued after vulnerabilities are 
discovered, but there could be a substantial time lag to release 
patches or the patches may not be applied in time. The patch 
for the vulnerability exploited by Stuxnet in 2010 became 
available in 2012 [28]. There is generally a time lag for patch 
application, for instance, Slammer infections occurred six 
months after the patch to fix the vulnerability had been 
released [10]. Similarly lack of user incentives [34] to apply 
patching enabled Code Red, a malware to infect 360,000 
servers, although a security patch had been released earlier. In 
some cases, an attack comes before vulnerability is discovered 
and is termed as a Zero day attack. 
B. Legacy systems with long operational life  
The installation of SCADA systems is costly and time-
consuming and most systems remain in operation from eight 
to fifteen years [10]. A system may have devices from many 
different manufacturers using various standards or proprietary 
communications protocols [35]. This is sometimes well past 
the expected supported lifespan of the software and also 
hardware. Thus at times a system would comprise of legacy 
components and their associated vulnerabilities [29]. 
C. Multiple Points of Entry and Failure 
A SCADA system is geographically spread over a large 
area starting at the sensors, in the field, to the user and control 
interface. Although SCADA servers may themselves be well 
protected against cyber attacks, however similar guarantees do 
not exist for field devices. The communication network, 
comprising of wireless Internet, cellular and Bluetooth provide 
multiple remote entry points which can be exploited by 
attackers. Wireless networks are especially vulnerable using 
freely available tools like Aircrack-NG that can sniff, test and 
even decrypt packets [36]. 
D. Communication Protocols 
The low-level networking protocols used for industrial 
systems use simple plain-text messages based on a master-
slave communications model. These lack security and 
encryption, as these were designed for isolated systems [13]. 
For example, Modbus protocol can be attacked as reported 
in [8], [37] with varying consequences [37]. Other recent 
protocols, such as Distributed Network Protocol 3.0 (DNP3) 
also have their vulnerabilities [5], [38], [39] and packets can 
also be analysed [36] through network sniffing tools to gain 
information and cause damage. Widely used protocols IEC 
60870-5-101 and IEC 60870-5-104 lack application and data 
link layer security and have vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited [13]. With an understanding of the process and the 
protocol, an attacker can maliciously alter the process control 
by injecting valid control commands and responses with 
malicious intent [13], [22]. Attacks on protocol 
implementation [37] can cause failures resulting in possible 
exploits [8]. 
E. Real-time and Complex Interactions 
SCADA systems monitor real-world processes under very 
tight timing and operational constraints. Time is critical for 
decision making, affecting a control system and vital process 
deviations, which must be accurately reflected and effectively 
managed. The stringent operational constraints (such as 
timing) of a SCADA system mean that it is more prone to fail 
in response to small deviations caused by an attacker. “Aurora 
Generator Test” [1], [10] in March 2007, simulated a remote 
cyber-attack resulting in destruction of a $1 million dollar 
diesel-electric generator [40]. A patch application [25] or loss 
of time synchronization [1] may have unintended consequences 
detrimental to the prescribed operation. Application of a 
software update resulted in automatic shutdown of a nuclear 
plant [10]. Analysing and exploiting vulnerabilities may be 
complicated but unintelligent computer viruses and mere 
malfunctions in small devices can result in enormous 
unintended effects [10]. 
F. Conflicting Priorities  
SCADA control and monitoring projects remain in 
continuous operation [41] for many decades after 
commissioning. This creates a dilemma for the administrators 
between ensuring adequate protection and sustained system 
operation. Application of software upgrades and patches may 
get postponed due to the desire to keep the system running 
without change to the execution environment [28]. Anti-virus 
and patches may result in undesirable consequences [10] or 
may also tend to slow down the communication and may 
interfere with normal functioning of the system. 
The operational nature of these systems precludes post 
commissioning cyber security testing due to associated risks 
of jeopardising the controlled system. 
G. Social Engineering and Insider Attacks  
Social engineering attacks purporting to be from a known 
person or organization can be used to infiltrate a system. Often 
the cyber security is focused on an outsider’s attack, which 
makes sense, but equally probable and dangerous is an attack 
originating from within the trusted network, through a 
deliberate or unintentional omission, or sabotage.  
The attack in 2000 on a sewage control system in 
Queensland, Australia [10], [42] causing flooding with a 
million litres of sewage, was an act of a disgruntled employee. 
Stuxnet infiltrated the network [10], [16] mainly through USB 
sticks.  
H. Backdoors 
The Stuxnet [43] worm exploited system vulnerabilities to 
attack a PLC in Iran’s uranium enrichment program in 2010. It 
exploited an administrative backdoor, which can be used to 
access a system remotely, and generally their availability on a 
system is known to system maker only. Such coded backdoor 
passwords which can be used to exploit a system remotely, are 
not uncommon [19], [44]. Such malpractice could also take 
place without the knowledge of a SCADA vendor, as 
increasingly the product is assembled from components 
manufactured from facilities across the globe [19]. 
I. Integral Protection 
With cyber security awareness coming into prominence, 
SCADA manufacturers also provide and emphasize security in 
products. These features provide encryption and security 
features such as Kerberos and multiplexing proxy. Activating 
these in a project can make an intruder’s task difficult. 
SCADA systems also provide other built-in mechanisms such 
as User Groups, Historian, Encryption and Redundant Servers. 
III. SIMULATION AND MODELLING 
SCADA systems are not only complex but have many 
system interdependencies which makes it difficult for them to 
be tested for cyber defence. The production systems are 
required to provide a continuous and reliable service, and 
depending on the monitored process, even small delays are 
intolerable. As such the systems cannot be taken out of service 
for vulnerability checks, and also these are very costly and 
hard to duplicate. 
Simulation and modelling techniques are useful to model 
and test complex systems. Development of realistic models 
help to create scenarios that do not yet exist or would be very 
costly to build. A model also makes it easier to quickly change 
parameters to suit another scenario or configuration.  
Simulation and modelling techniques are used 
advantageously to evaluate and probe the defence of SCADA 
systems. A summary is provided in Tables I and II. 
A. Simulation Frameworks 
Simulation frameworks are needed to model all aspects of 
the SCADA system using simulators and emulators. Generally 
a network simulator such as OMNeT++ is used for network 
modelling and Simulink/MATLAB is used to simulate the 
process control. A framework in general also provides the 
facility to integrate the various simulators to realistically 
represent the system as a whole.   
1) High Level Architecture (HLA)  
HLA is a simulation integration platform designed by the 
Department of Defence (DoD) [45] that can be used to 
integrate simulators. This concept was chosen as no single 
simulation can meet all the requirements. An individual or a 
set of simulations can be applied across different uses, under 
the HLA federation concept. Federation means a set of 
interacting simulations, with each simulation termed as a 
federate. The federates must allow exchange of data through 
the Runtime Infrastructure (RTI).  
HLA which is a co-simulation environment has been used 
by researchers to design simulations using OMNeT++ and 
MATLAB, for example.  
Chabuksawar et al. [46] used Command and Control (C2) 
WindTunnel as a simulation framework (based on HLA) [47] 
to simulate a plant, its controller and the interconnecting 
network. The objective was to simulate network security 
attacks using this framework that requires domain-specific 
modelling language for defining integration models. The 
SCADA system was a simplified version of the Tennessee 
Eastman Control challenge problem [48]. DDoS attacks were 
simulated on the routers concluding a proof of concept 
implementation. 
2) SCADASiM  
An integrated framework for control system simulation, 
SCADASiM is presented by Mahoney and Gandhi in [9]. It 
can be modelled and simulated at different levels of 
abstractions commensurate with the problem at hand. The 
modelling notation is through Autonomous Component 
Architectures (ACA) that allows components to be modelled 
at simulation runtime. The authors proposed a new language 
Autonomous Component based policy Description Language 
for Anomaly monitoring in Control Systems) (ADACS) that 
was used for monitoring regulatory compliance. 
3) SCADASim  
Queiroz et al. [49] present a framework for building 
SCADA system simulations. Additionally it can be used to 
create malicious attacks against SCADA systems. The 
framework can be extended by SCADASim users to add their 
own protocols otherwise there are too many protocols. The 
framework is built on top of OMNeT++. Details of DoS and 
spoofing attack simulation are provided in the paper.  
4) Co-simulation Framework  
A co-simulation framework is proposed by Bytschkow et 
al. [50] using Common information model (CIM) as an 
intermediate model. It uses the approach of federation 
enabling both simulation and deriving possible impacts. The 
co-simulation framework is constructed using SCADA, CIM, 
GRIDLAB-D and AKKA. 
5) Emulation Framework  
A framework for emulation based security analysis using 
Emulab and Simulink is proposed by Genge et al. [6] that can 
be used to measure impact of attacks against both physical and 
cyber parts of systems. The authors’ proposed framework 
extends Emulab to incorporate additional features required for 
cyber physical security analysis. The architecture comprises of 
a cyber layer, physical layer, and a cyber physical link layer. 
The authors provide a feature based, cost based and an 
experimental scenario-based in comparison to other 
frameworks reported in the literature and contend their 
approach to be better. The authors provide two case studies 
from the electrical and chemical domains. The first studies the 
effect of Stuxnet on a Boiling Water power plant showing that 
the proposed framework can be used to recreate a scenario 
with complex malware. The second studies the effect of 
network parameters on a cyber attack targeting a chemical 
process, showing that in cyber attacks where the attacker 
communicates with PLCs, the communications delays and 
packet losses have little effect.  
6) Integration Framework 
An integration framework has been proposed by Novak et 
al. [51] that advocates semantic and technical integration of 
simulation models into SCADA systems. The authors contend 
that simulations cannot be developed without access to online 
and historical data and thus propose a platform for integration 
of simulations and SCADA. It reduces design-time errors (for 
simulation) and improves re-configurability and reuse. Two 
case studies are provided for design of simulation models for 
passive houses, and an application allowing the management 
and execution of simulations.  
7) Real-time monitoring, Anomaly detection, Impact 
analysis, and Mitigation strategies (RAIM) 
The security SCADA framework proposed by Ten et al. 
[52] comprises of real-time monitoring, anomaly detection, 
impact analysis, and mitigation strategies (RAIM). Real-time 
monitoring can utilise the data for real-time control functions. 
Anomaly detection and impact analysis can be done through 
monitoring and correlating the system logs. The output is 
ranked as varying degrees of risks, based on which mitigation 
actions can be taken. 
B. Test Beds 
Test bed is a platform used to test systems or technologies 
where the actual system cannot be endangered by testing, due 
to unintended consequences, for example, checking the effects 
of patch application and response to malware. A test bed must 
capture the essence of the system under test for it to be useful. 
The facility can also be shared to save cost or share 
knowledge. Test bed creation is also recommended in [2]. 
Although some test beds have been developed by large 
organisations, generally the access is restricted to affiliated 
researchers only [53]. Unlike a simulation environment being 
fully contained in software, a test bed uses hardware, 
simulated and emulated devices. A survey of test beds in 
software and hardware is provided in [53]. 
Test beds could be realised [54] as simple simulation based 
(TrueTime), federated simulation (several dedicated 
simulation federates for plant, network etc. such as HLA) or 
emulation/implementation based (real hardware or emulator 
such as EmuLab). 
1) National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) 
The Department of Energy, US, have established a National 
SCADA test bed [55] that aims to provide testing, research 
and training facilities to help improve the security of control 
systems. However free access to academia and industry is not 
available. Thus, many researchers have developed test beds to 
investigate some element of security. 
2) TRUST 
An experimental simulation test bed TRUST-SCADA [56] 
was aimed to assess and address vulnerabilities, and to provide 
an open-source design for a flexible test bed. DoD/HLA was 
chosen as the integration platform, for the plant model 
(Simulink/Stateflow), Network model using (OMNeT++, 
NS2, OPNET) and controller (Simulink/Stateflow). 
The authors [54] have also proposed a test bed for SCADA 
vulnerabilities and validating security. The specific scenarios 
analysed were DoS attack on sensors, integrity attacks, and 
phishing attacks 
3) Live Virtual and Constructive (LVC) Test Bed 
Urias et al. [29] describe a hybrid test bed that can be used 
to perform cyber-physical security analysis. It was developed 
at Sandia National Laboratories to identify system level 
vulnerabilities, results of their exploitation, and approaches to 
eliminate it. Simulated network devices were represented 
using OPNET, enabling passing of simulated traffic to real 
devices. Virtual machines were used as hosts, servers and 
Cisco routers’ emulation, and physical devices to which the 
simulated network traffic could be addressed. The experiments 
setup simulated the enterprise and control system network and 
provides analysis of cyber attacks against the business and 
control system network. The experiments investigated the 
effects of attacks on SCADA protocols (DNP and Modbus 
TCP) and how to mitigate such attacks using network security. 
4) TrueTime 
A simple test bed [57] has been proposed by Farooqui et al. 
using TrueTime (MATLAB/Simulink based simulator 
developed by Lund University) to simulate DoS attacks and its 
effects. The SCADA network is designed to control four 
different DC servo motors through a reference signal. The 
DoS attack scenarios covered attack on a PID controller and a 
specified actuator. 
5) Research and Pedagogy 
A test bed for SCADA cyber security research and 
pedagogy has been developed by Morris et al. [58]. It provides 
the facility to discover vulnerabilities, implications and 
classification of vulnerabilities by type, mitigations and 
validations. Developed at Mississippi State University, it 
models various industrial applications such as smart grid and 




The OPNET test bed by Mallouhi et al. [5] is used to 
simulate networks, PowerWorld simulation system to simulate 
the functioning of power grid, and Autonomic Software 
Protection System (ASPS) for detection and protection against 
SCADA cyber security attacks.  The attack detection is based 
on an anomaly based approach. It provides details of DNP, 
Modbus, and TCP/IP attacks through a training and detection 
phase. 
7) Power Station Simulation 
The test bed proposed by Hahn et al. [59] consists of 
power station simulation, substation automation and SCADA 
system, and uses scenarios based on anomaly detection. It is 
based on real-time monitoring, anomaly detection, impact 
analysis, and mitigation strategies (RAIM). The test bed uses 
ICCP, DNP 3.0 over TCP/IP, and OPC communication 
protocols.  
8) Power Control System  
A test bed for a simulated power control systems is 
reported by Dondossola et al. [60] for collection of data 
through controlled experiments on a power system test bed, 
and activities for using the collected data for analysis and risk 
assessment frameworks. Cyber threats such as DoS and false 
injection attacks were investigated. The authors also gathered 
statistics based on message delays, number of lost messages, 
and time to failure to UDP flooding attacks. 
9) Common Open Research Emulator (CORE) 
Tesfahun and Bhaskari [61] propose a scalable and 
reconfigurable virtual SCADA security test bed for developing 
and evaluating security solutions. The authors provide a 
labelled dataset for other researchers. It is based on Common 
Open Research Emulator (CORE) for simulating SCADA 
networks. It is possible to launch multiple attacks 
simultaneously and benchmark datasets can also be generated. 
CORE can be connected to real world networks, with the 
Python module to customise network emulation. The 
researchers represented SCADA devices by a virtual node in 
CORE. DDoS and False Data Injection attack were simulated. 
10) Software Defined Networking (SDN)  
 SDN makes it possible to dynamically reconfigure an IP 
network. Dong et al. [1] explore the use of SDN techniques 
for enhancing the protection against cyber attacks. The authors 
propose a co-simulation test bed comprising Mininet (to 
emulate smart grid communications), and PowerWorld (to 
simulate physical aspects of power systems). The test bed has 
Bro-based IDS to analyse the DNP3 traces and provide results 
for SDN countermeasures. Three use cases were considered to 
demonstrate the SDN potential for strengthening the 
resilience. 
11) SCADA Virtual Test Environment 
A test environment is proposed by Boldea [62] to assess 
the security of SCADA systems, and the use of virtual systems 
to emulate the real systems, and used GNS3 for network 
components and Virtual Box for software virtualisation. The 
SCADA test bed used the free SCADA 2 software with a 
Designer and Runtime tool to simulate DDoS attacks. 
C. Simulating SCADA Attacks 
Simulating SCADA attacks makes it possible to explore the 
cyber defence of the system under investigation. The results 
can then be used to strengthen the defence.  
1) Malware Attacks 
Malware or malicious software poses a serious threat to 
SCADA systems. The vulnerabilities present in the IT and 
communications systems can be exploited by viruses and 
malware, hence making SCADA systems vulnerable to such 
attacks as reported by Fovinoa et al. [24]. 
A malware attack simulator for testing SCADA system 
under controlled environments, Mobile Agent Malware 
Simulator MAlSim has been proposed by Leszczyna et al. 
[63]. The toolkit provides the facility to implement various 
types of malware. The aim was to provide security assessment 
based on simulated attacks. It can be used to simulate well-
known malware such as Code Red, SQL Slammer. A malware 
template is comprised of a MAlsim agent with its behavioural 
and migration patterns. 
MAlsim was used by Fovinoa et al. [24] to investigate 
malware attacks on a SCADA system on a power plant test 
bed comprising of a process network, field network, intranet, 
data exchange network, external network and observer 
network. The code for Code Red, Nimda, Slammer and 
Scalper was obtained and injected into the process network to 
activate these malwares. The malwares infected the machines 
but did not lead to system failures. The authors also provide 
results for a Modbus DoS and network attack.  
Ciancamerla et al. [64] provide results for a malware 
injection on an electric grid.  
2) Network Attacks 
Chabuksawar et al. [46] used a simulator that uses 
C2WindTunnel. The paper emphasizes co-simulation of 
controller and plant dynamics in Simulink/MATLAB and 
network architecture and behaviour in a network simulator 
like OMNeT++ [24]. 
NETA is a framework for the simulation of 
communication networks attacks. Network Attacks (NETA) 
[65] is based on OMNeT++ and provides a framework for 
simulating attacks in heterogeneous networks. 
 
3) Communication Protocol Attacks 
There are hundreds of communications protocols in use for 
SCADA communications. Jin et al. [39] provide modelling of 
buffer flooding attack on DNP3 protocol. A simple flooding 
attack fills the event buffer in the data aggregator so that the 
critical alerts from legitimate devices cannot be buffered 
which impacts the control station’s situational awareness. The 
behaviour is analysed through a simulation model [39]. Moya 
et al. [66] describe a Grey Hole attack against a SCADA 
substation using DNP3.0. 
Fovino et al. [67] provided a filtering system based on 
state analysis for securing SCADA protocols, Modbus and 
DNP3. The aim of the study was to detect attacks where a set 
of licit commands on execution can disrupt a SCADA system 
while in particular states. A firewall does not guarantee 
complete protection to SCADA systems, as it operates on a 
signature-based approach. Thus a firewall needs the system 
state and the set of unwanted states. In order to check whether 
the system is proceeding to a critical state from which the 
distance from critical states can be calculated.  The proposed 
method was validated on a prototype system.  
A ‘C’ language graph based implementation by Genge and 
Siaterlis [22] for network segmentation separates control 
hardware regulating input flows from output flows of the 
industrial process for SCADA resilience. The human expert is 
needed to construct a directed graph where vertices are 
process units and edges are product flows, the segmentation is 
performed through a heuristic algorithm. The methodology 
was applied on the Tennessee-Eastman chemical process using 
two attack scenarios on PLCs using Modbus protocol and the 
results show that it can be used for defence against Stuxnet 
like attacks.  
 A graph theory analysis for IEEE 118 bus system is 
presented by Srivastava et al.[40]. 
4) Denial-of-Service/MITM 
This has been the most well studied type of attack as it is 
easy to implement and launch. A malicious agent can flood a 
specific device through protocol exploitation, resulting in 
bandwidth saturation that renders the service unavailable as 
described by Ciancamerla et al. [64]. SCADA system 
vulnerability analysis through DDoS attack is presented by 
Petrovic and Stojanovic [74]. The simulation considers a 
corporate and SCADA network. A DoS attack on an actual 
SCADA system of a medium voltage electrical grid is 
provided in [64]. Malware attack results for DoS for Modbus 
protocol is provided in [24].  
The wireless packets are easy to exploit because the 
intruder does not have to be physically connected to the 
network (as in wired) to access the network traffic. Xie et al. 
[68] have proposed a simulation platform based on radio 
modem for analysing radio modem security. Radio modems 
are typically used for long range communications to connect 
PLC, RTU etc. but often the data is sent in plain text that can 
be exploited. The paper explored four types of attacks, that is, 
communication jam, data eavesdropping data tamper and 
eavesdropping, and DoS attack. 
MITM attacks on IEC 60870-5-104 SCADA networks are 
described by Maynard et al. [76]. Details of the protocol 
packet payload are provided. MITM attacks will follow the 
stages of detection (to identify targets), capture (data 
collection), and finally attack. The experiments cover relay 
and MITM attacks and, attackers with varying degrees of 
experience can compromise the system by hiding fault 
condition from a SCADA server. 
5) False Data Injection (FDI) 
In False data injection attack the stored or transmitted data 
from RTUs, control centre or communications infrastructure is 
modified with a malicious intent [77]. 
Hug and Giampapa [77] considered the FDI attack on a 
SCADA system for a power grid for ac state estimation. 
Through simulation using IEEE 57 bus system, details are 
provided for a number of measurements that the attacker needs 
to alter, to stay hidden. If the attacker has knowledge of the 
system data then the attack will not be noticed through the ac 
state estimation. FDI were also investigated in [60]. 
6) False Sequential Logic Attacks 
Li et al. [79] proposed a false sequential logic attack on a 
SCADA system. An informed attacker can alter the sequential 
logic of control to disrupt the physical process before the 
intrusion is detected. The sequential logic of the physical 
process is modelled as finite state machine (FSM). Traditional 
IDS will not be able to detect an intrusion as it is based on licit 
commands, demonstrated for a three tank system. To detect 
the proposed attack there is a need for sequential logic feature-
based IDS to continuously monitor the control sequence. 
7) Integrity Attacks 
An attacker can gain access to the sensors and/or actuators 
and modify the software to launch a coordinated attack as 
reported by Mo et al. [80]. Data integrity attacks wherein the 
sensor or control signals are manipulated can have severe 
consequences as the operator could be misled into taking 
wrong actions. These attacks are more difficult to overcome as 
their onset is not as obvious as DoS attacks. In [80] the authors 
focused on techniques for integrity attack detection and 
describe an analytic approach verified through simulation for 
detecting replay attacks on sensors. It assumes that the 
attacker has capability to read sensor inputs and capability to 
inject input. 
Such an attack however would require knowledge of the 
system as described by Sridhar and Manimaran [81]. In [81] 
an integrity attack is simulated on an Automatic Gain Control 
(AGC) loop that keeps both tie-line flow and frequency 
deviation values correct. Simulation is performed on a two-
area system, and verifies that the system can be led to an 
unhealthy state by an attacker manipulating values 
intelligently. 
Unsupervised anomaly detection for integrity attacks on 
SCADA systems is described in [11]. 
8) Real-time and Simulation Monitor 
A methodology to ensure SCADA availability through a 
real-time monitor and a simulation monitor is proposed by 
Shen et al. [82]. The real-time monitor, monitors states and 
events and based on that, estimates if there are faults or risks. 
The simulation monitor simulates control commands, monitors 
and predicts the results of those commands and estimates 
whether the commands are dangerous or not. The 
methodology is then tested on a simulated water treatment 
system. 
D. Mathematical Modelling 
Modelling techniques provide a reliable and formal 
mechanism for validating a system under attack. Linear 
dynamical models [30] are used to model the behaviour of 
control systems. A model for a web robot network (botnet) is 
proposed by Brand et al. [83], which can be used to attack the 
system in different ways. Botnets can bring down a server 
through a DDoS attack from many compromised machines as 
investigated by Baecher et al. [84]. 
Backhaus et al. [12] describe a game theory model to 
outline a scenario where the attacker, after gaining access to 
the system will interact through its control system with the 
system operator, and the outcome of these machine-machine 
interactions will be governed by the design of the physical and 
control systems. Considering a simple model, the interactions 
of the attacker and defender are explored and the outcome is 
estimated. Extensions to real world complex problems would 
increase the computational requirements exponentially.  
 Yang et al. [85] proposed Factor Neural Network (FNN) 
to study the security problem in SCADA through developing a 
FNN-based security defence architecture model. The attack 
and defence of SCADA is taken as online digital intelligent 
antagonising process and all reasoning, judgement and 
thinking is abstracted into corresponding network attacks and 
defence knowledge system. The proposed model needs further 
research into SCADA network attack simulation. 
Cardenas et al. [75] use a mathematical formulation to 
detect and survive attacks in specific research problems. The 
physical system is modelled as a linear dynamical system. 
Testing complex SCADA systems is challenging, Süß et 
al. [86] propose the use of Modelica and Eclipse Modeling 
framework. Modelica is a mathematical modelling language 
for complex physical systems and offers Ecore, the meta-
language of the Eclipse framework. The focus is on an 
integrated unified model driven development environment.  
E. Probabilistic Modelling 
Queiroz et al. [87] propose a survivability model based on 
Bayesian networks, taking into account the type of protocol 
communication. The focus is on system survivability despite 
attacks. The simulated system consisted of fibre networks 
modelled using SCADASim [62] to simulate and test the 
model. Such techniques are very useful as the complex 
interaction between system components can be easily 
validated. A Bayesian attack graph model is proposed Zhang 
et al. [88].  
F. Risk Modelling and Assessment 
A review of risk assessment techniques is provided by 
Cherdantseva et al. [89]. Risk management reduces the 
likelihood of cyber attacks disrupting SCADA and in the event 
of a successful attack reducing the severity of the 
consequences as described by Henry and Haimes [90].  
An integrated methodology for managing the risk of cyber 
attacks is reported in [91]. Minimax envelopes are developed 
for dynamic multi objective models to address scenario 
uncertainty, due to different attacker motives and points of 
access.  
A Network Security Risk Model (NSRM) for cyber risk 
analysis of the control system is proposed in [90]. The model 
is applied on an example system of a simplified crude oil 
pipeline pump station. NSRM is an attack model with a 
directed graph, where nodes represent process components 
and edges are the linkages from one process component to 
another. The model defines the state space where transitions 
take place with transition probabilities in response to 
attacker’s actions.  
A survey of available tools for SCADA risk assessment is 
provided by Ralston et al. [92]. It mainly covers probabilistic 
risk assessment to estimate the risk from SCADA systems. 
A network vulnerability analysis using attack graphs is 
provided by Phillips and Swiler [94]. The attack paths and 
their probabilities could be identified and vulnerable system 
components can also be identified. In attack graphs, each node 
represents a possible attack state and each edge represents a 
success probability. The inputs to the system are configuration 
files, attacker profiles, and attack templates. An example is 
provided for generation and analysis of graph.  
Attack-Trees were first described by Schneier [69] and are 
a widely used technology for risk assessment of safety-critical 
systems. The attack goal is modelled as the root of the tree and 
various possible ways of accomplishing the goal are the 
leaves. These make it easier to identify the more probable 
causes and make predictions. Attack trees visually describe the 
possible attack paths and can be used for risk assessment as 
described by Bouchti and Haqiq [70]. 
Moore et al.  [71] provide guidance on documenting 
security attacks in a reusable form through an example. The 
practicality of an attack tree for a real-world system is 
governed by re-using an attack pattern. Through the chosen 
example of an enterprise, the authors describe the 
documentation of security attacks in a reusable form. Thus it 
provides a means to organize historical attack data for later 
analysis. 
The attack tree methodology was used by Byres et al. [72] 
to model cyber attacks on SCADA systems. The authors 
provide some examples of risk analysis for attackers’ goals of 
gaining access to the SCADA system, identifying Modbus 
device and compromising the master, and highlight the 
security issues. The authors describe their methodology 
through identifying eleven attackers’ goals which were 
elaborated for their technical difficulty, probability of 
detection, and underlying critical vulnerabilities. They 
conclude that all the attack avenues depend on an attacker 
getting network access. The authors point to more rigorous 
work that is required for the techniques to be usefully 
employed. 
Ten et al. [73] used attack trees for vulnerability 
assessment of SCADA systems. The paper considers an 
analytical model to measure vulnerabilities of a control centre. 
The methodology used vulnerability index as likelihood that 
an attack tree or leaf will be compromised. 
Bouchti et al. [70] extended the attack trees with new 
modelling constructs and analysis approaches to propose 
Colored Petri Net (CoPNet) to model intrusion. Petri Net is a 
mathematical modelling language that can be used as a visual 
communication tool. Based on the mapping rules, a CoPNet 
model can be built from Attack trees. CoPNet can model both 
defences and attacks, unlike an attack tree that can only model 
attacks. The proposed method is applied to a 3bus power grid 
and its SCADA network. The model provides better modelling 
compared to attack trees but has a more complicated form. 
Attack trees have been used by Ten et al. [52] for intrusion 
modelling. The study is focused on the ports and passwords on 
control network computers. The vulnerabilities were depicted 
as a risk table. The hardening through administrative 
passwords was also tested.   
Bayesian attack graph models are applied by Zhang et al.  
[88] for power system attack scenarios of breaker trips through 
IEDs. A mean time-to-compromise (MTTC) model is used to 
estimate time for successful intrusion of cyber components. 
Bayesian networks model attack graphs using probabilities. 
Two attack graph models are considered, first is the attack 
graph of vulnerabilities, and the second estimates successful 
intrusion on communications links. The reliability analysis is 
provided for the attacks considered. 
IV. TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES  
In this Section, we describe the tools that can be used either 
for gathering more information about an intended target 
system or those which can actively attack a system with or 
without such analysis. A summary is provided in Table III. 
A. Scanning Tools 
Any information about network addresses or open ports of 
a potential target can help the attacker to develop an attack 
methodology. By knowing which ports are open and listening, 
it is easy to infer about the running programs and then 
devising an exploit or attack methodology. If the attacker has 
access to the network, then through freely available tools it is 
possible to gather information about a system or to actively 
target it. In general the more information that gets collected 
the higher will be the damage caused [13]. Using similar tools 
as available to a hacker, can help to determine the weaknesses 
of the system and to provide a timely fix.  
Nmap [95] is a freely downloadable scanning tool that can 
be used to gather information about a single machine or the 
whole network. It can provide information about the open 
ports, services being run and the operating system, and even 
the firewalls in use, as well as other characteristics. All of this 
provides valuable information to an attacker to plan the attack. 
Port scanning is often done before the penetration testing. 
Traffic to an open port would legitimately pass through a 
firewall and may be used to determine the Trojan or other 
malicious code running on a machine. However, Nmap can be 
run from one of the machines in the network which may be 
difficult for an intruder. 
In contrast to a wired network, packets on a wireless 
network are easy to intercept because the intruder could 
intercept packets just by being in the range. There are tools 
such as Aircrack-NG that let packets to be captured. 
B. Penetration Testing 
Tools such as metasploit [96] can be use for penetration 
testing. Sploitware [97] which is a framework designed 
specifically for penetration testing of SCADA systems can be 
used to check for SCADA vulnerabilities.  
C. Machine Learning 
Machine learning techniques are mostly based on statistics 
and can analyse the process data to isolate anomalous data that 
signal malicious behaviour. Thus making automated machine 
learning techniques more appropriate and efficient compared 
to human analysts [98]. 
 Almalawi et al. [11] proposed an unsupervised anomaly 
based detection scheme for a water distribution system to 
detect inconsistent states using k-nearest neighbours (KNN) 
and clustering using k-means. The inconsistencies could be 
either inconsistent network traffic pattern or SCADA data 
[11]. Simulated and real data sets are used to simulate MITM 
attacks on Modbus/TCP. The authors show their scheme to 
perform better than supervised and semi-supervised schemes.  
   Machine learning techniques have been applied to 
telecommunications; [98] proposed one class SVM for 
automated anomaly detection from SCADA 
telecommunications data. 
Torrisi et al. [78] propose SVM based traffic analysis using 
message direction and timing information to protect against 
Grey Hole attacks. Unlike other work that is focused on 
identifying the different protocols in an encrypted tunnel, the 
authors consider an attack classifying messages that belong to 
the same application layer protocol, DNP3, and investigate the 
ability to cause interference in SCADA monitoring. In a grey 
hole attack, as the solicited responses from the master are let 
through and the unsolicited messages are dropped, the master 
would still not be aware of the message drop and thus the 
attacker can remain undetected. The message drop would 
result in the operator observation to be off by about 10-20%. 
Such attacks could be mitigated through use of TCP as the 
sequence numbering works in both directions and loss would 
be detected or by modifying the DNP3.0 protocol to use 
related sequence numbers for both unsolicited and solicited 
messages. 
SVM techniques were used in [99] to identify malware and 
demonstrate use of an ‘eigenvector’ pre-filter to remove 
irrelevant features from the dataset.  
Nader et al. [100] propose to detect malicious intrusions 
through machine learning after they have bypassed IDS. The 
paper investigates lp-norms in Radial Basis Function (RBF) 
kernels for intrusion detection using one class classification 
techniques of support vector data description (SVDD) and the 
Kernel Principal Component Analysis (KPCA). The selected 
algorithms are applied on the gas pipeline test bed and 
compared to other selected methods, was faster, had higher 
error detection rates, and lowest false alarm rates. Application 
on a water treatment dataset gave better results for KPCA 
compared to SVDD.  
A cloud based data analysis system for Los Angeles Smart 
Grid Project is described by Simmhan et al. [101]. It was 
based on Floe data flow framework which is hosted elastically 
on VMs and is supported by major cloud providers. The work 
demonstrates value of cloud computing and data analytics for 
smart grids but provides insights for mining similar data for 
just SCADA systems. Some principles for smart grid analysis 
are provided in [102] by Accenture. 
D. Network Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
IDS work by inspecting the network traffic and mainly 
comprise of two approaches: signature based and anomaly 
based. The signature detection matches traffic to a known 
misuse pattern, while the anomaly detection works on the 
normalities in the observed data and can detect unknown 
attacks [14], [15]. 
A review of IDS schemes and a decentralised multi agent 
scheme is proposed by MacDermott et al. [103]. Digital Bond 
Quickdraw project [104] releases IDS signatures for DNP3, 
EtherNet/IP and Modbus/TCP that can be used to identify 
possible attacks [14]. 
A rule-based IDS is proposed by Yang et al. [14] for IEC 
60870-5-104 protocol which is used for basic telecontrol tasks 
but the messages are in plain text and it also has inherent 
TCP/IP issues. The authors use Internet Traffic and Content 
Analysis (ITACA) tool for traffic sniffing. The proposed 
signature and model based approaches were validated by 
capturing normal traffic followed by abnormal packets, and 
effectively identified all abnormal data for the given rules and 
dataset.  
This work has been extended by the authors of [14] for IEC/ 
60870-5-104 protocols by deriving stateful protocol analysis 
approach [105]. Stateful analysis compares predetermined 
acceptable protocol behaviours against observed activities to 
detect deviations or intrusions. A detection state machine is 
proposed and applied for stateful IDS for SACDA systems. 
Similar to attack tools, there are freely available tools that 
make it possible to detect and prevent an intrusion. A guide 
[106] to intrusion detection and protection is available by 
NIST. 
Malicious users understand signature-based technologies 
and can craft malware that can elude such systems and remain 
undetected, as described by Winn et al. [107]. 
Some work has been reported based on machine learning 
techniques. The communications data sets from SCADA are 
analysed by Jiang and Yasakethu [98] with one class SVM to 
cluster the anomalies and generate an alarm based on 
perceived severity. 
Oman and Phillips [35] described an implementation of a 
customised IDS and event monitoring system. The system can 
assist operators to identify erroneous or malicious settings and 
activities in the system. 
The inadequacy of rule based approaches with reference to 
firewalls is elaborated in [67] by stating that for control 
systems, even a sequence of licit commands can lead the 
system to an unsafe state. 
IDS based on critical state analysis in a power plant are 
proposed by Carcano et al. [108]. The authors contend that the 
system critical states, as a result of cyber attacks or system 
faults, can be segregated based on IDS that is aware of such 
critical system states, from known or unknown attacks. The 
authors develop a new Industrial State Modelling Language 
(ISML) and use it to define states. By monitoring the system 
states a critical state can be detected before it occurs by 
monitoring the distance form a critical state. The proposed 
scheme can also detect zero day attacks as it is based on 
system states from known to critical. 
Kirsch et al. [41] describe what they term as a first 
survivable SCADA system using replication of SCADA 
master that continues with minimal degradation during cyber 
attacks. The system runs several copies of SCADA master 
thus the application acts as its own firewall and does not 
require prior knowledge of attack signatures. The replication 
protocol assumes that some of the replicas are compromised. 
The authors propose a state machine approach where all 
replicas start in the same initial state and cooperate to execute 
an event that ensures all replicas proceed through the same 
state sequence. Prime client library is used to link RTUs and 
HMI to SCADA master. A polling and scalability scenario 
were used to validate the proposed system. 
Snort [109] is a free tool for intrusion detection that can 
analyse traffic, packet logging, and protocol analysis. OSSEC 
[110] is another open source tool for intrusion detection. An 
early detection of an intrusion can help to contain its effect 
and potential damage [98], thus making such techniques 
extremely useful. 
E. Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) 
An IPS performs the intrusion detection and additionally 
also attempts to prevent/stop certain incidents [103]. An IPS 
monitors the network for any malicious activity and also 
attempts at stopping the intrusion, and raises an alert. Snort 
[109] can also perform intrusion prevention. 
There is little research reported on IPS unlike IDS which is 
comparatively heavily researched.  
F. Honey pots (also conpot) 
Honey pots are computer systems deployed as decoys to 
attract hackers to attack them and thus record the attackers’ 
actions. Thus sources and intentions of the attackers are 
obtained without exposing an actual system to exploitation 
risk. They provide knowledge about the tactics and techniques 
employed by the malicious users [107] and also about the 
origin of such attack.  
The implementation could be a low-interaction honeypot 
(LIH) that offers limited services or high-interaction honeypot 
(HIH) that implements a complete system [19], [84]. Honeyd 
and GenIII honeynet are examples of a LIH and HIH 
respectively [84]. For details of different honeypot based tools 
and their relative merits please see [84].  
Honeypot should mimic a device (such as PLC) as part of 
a larger system to be of interest to the attackers as described 
by Winn et al. [107]. Honeyd is a cost effective solution to 
deploy a realistic honeypot. During pilot studies it was used to 
advertise 75 PLC in [107]. Disso et al. [19] used honeynet 
Honeywall CDROM in a virtual machine as a honey pot. A 
PLC (low interaction) was emulated using HoneyD, and 
another PLC as high interaction.  
Although mimicking an industrial system is complex, the 
open source honeyd [111] makes it easier. The attack traces 
can be stored and analysed to determine the sources of attacks. 
The information about the potential people interested in 
acquiring information, hacking, and frequent visits can help to 
bolster up the defence. On identifying a honey pot, the hackers 
may employ anti-honeypoting techniques [107].  
A study to identify and group the traces left on honeypots 
to the botnets’ originating machines is described by Pham and 
Dacier [112] that enables identifying new botnets. The traces 
are represented as time series that could be arranged based on 
the country of origin of a source. The time series can then be 
correlated to detect attack events. The attack events then help 
to identify attacks from the same botnet or a group of botnets. 
 A large scale collection of malware [84] can help design 
counter-strategies such as network and host IDS. Baecher et 
al. introduce Nepenthes as a platform to deploy honeypots as 
vulnerability modules. It’s a scalable solution to emulate 
different operating systems and authors report experiments by 
emulating more than 16,000 different IP addresses on a single 
physical machine. Nepenthes is effective at detecting zero day 
attacks but is capable of collecting malware that is 
autonomously spreading. Their system collected 15,500 
unique binaries over a four months period, and analysing them 
with different anti-virus systems detected 80-90% as 
malicious, that is different anti-virus engines are missing a 
significant percentage of malware. 
Brand et al. [83] describe a malware rebirthing botnet that 
can be used to collect malware and rebirth it with new 
signatures to launch an orchestrated attack and avoid detection 
by AV software. 
Viruses can be countered by propagating the immunization 
agent as an epidemic as proposed by Goldenberg et al. [113]. 
The authors propose using the honey pot architecture for early 
virus discovery and fast antivirus dissemination. They provide 
a concrete example of an email network.  
G. Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
SIEM works by aggregating the information from the 
selected tools to a central repository for real-time trend 
analysis. An open-source product is OSSIM [93], [114]. 
Mahboob and Zubairi [93] proposed OSSIM (by AlienVault 
as above), that is an open source Linux based Security 
information and event management (SIEM) system for 
SCADA security by configuring OSSIM. OSSIM can bring 
together several security tools such as Open source security 
(OSSEC) and a GUI. OSSIM can correlate events from 
different sources such as firewalls, anomaly detectors, 
IDS/IPS, and network switches and combine these with known 
vulnerabilities. The authors used a PLC (as VM), Honeynet 
and Honeywall VM for GUI. Snort is used for IDS and 
OpenVAS for vulnerability scanning. Based on the results 
mitigation actions (patches) can be taken and the scanning can 
be performed again. OSSIM assigns a risk value to each event 
and has many other correlation features not fully explored by 
the authors.   
H. Ethical or White-hat Hacking 
The term white-hat hacking means to perform the same 
actions as that of a real or black-hat hacker to determine the 
security weaknesses in a system with the intention to fix them 
before exploitation. Encouragement through recognition and 
rewards for finding and reporting vulnerabilities will bring 
such skills to prominence and help protect systems from 
malicious black-hat hackers. At a more formal level [115] 
describes the certification of the cyber security skills 
I. Forensic Science 
It may be useful to do post attack analysis for protecting the 
systems as investigated by Erol-Kantarci and Mouftah [7] 
against similar future attacks. It is a new research area for 
SCADA with similarities to digital forensic in other areas. 
Valuable information can be gleaned from events preceding an 
attack. However as pointed by the authors there are some 
challenges such as live analysis and issues like privacy of data 
etc. that need to be overcome. 
Forensics [112] has also been applied to honey pot traces to 
identify new botnets originating from the same source 
machines or countries. 
V. CONCLUSION 
SCADA systems have gained prominence and widespread 
use beyond the traditional applications for highly critical 
systems such as power generation and transportation systems. 
Internet connectivity has changed the threat landscape and the 
recent interest and ability to monitor and control processes 
over the mobile network means even more diverse entry 
points. Thus effective strategies are required that can provide 
adequate protection against cyber-security threats and attacks. 
Perhaps the most important transformation needed is a 
different threat perception for SCADA systems.   
Current strategies such as simulation, modelling and other 
approaches reported in the research literature for determining 
the efficacy of a system against a cyber-attack have been 
reviewed in this paper. These techniques can be used to 
uncover the system vulnerabilities by determining the degree 
of protection against a possible attack. This helps the system 
developers and providers to assess their systems before 
commissioning, and system users/clients to be aware of 
security provisions and compliance to regulatory 
requirements.       
In view of the fast changing cyber threat landscape, 
adoption of security techniques will be offset by 
corresponding new threats being evolved. Hence there would 
always be a need for continuous evaluation and evolution of 
cyber defence practises to match the corresponding threats. 
The guidelines provided by the agencies [2], [106], [122] are 
steps in the right direction to lay down industry’s best 
practices. One of the promising techniques in this category is 
penetration testing, especially by third party that can help to 
expose hidden vulnerabilities [17] and implement corrective 
action enabling system validation and remedy of any security 
weaknesses. 
There are other promising techniques, such as simulation, 
modelling, and security assessment and honey pots. This 
coupled with the desire of the SCADA vendors to provide 
integration with commercial database systems, will make it 
possible for real time data analytics to identify a threat vector 
before it strikes. The selected techniques are important for the 
system developers to confirm adherence to security policies 
and certify a degree of protection against threats. 
VI. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Recent technological developments in communications 
and networking have revolutionised the control and process 
networks making it much easier to access the data remotely 
and conveniently. The current research for cyber security 
protection has many promising techniques. 
The emerging techniques such as SDN (highlight re-
configurability) and virtualization platform provides many 
benefits such as copying, restoring, deleting and backing-up 
virtual machines (VMs) on the fly. High Availability and 
Vmotion which enable continued operation of a virtual 
machine during migration. The virtualization platform 
provides many benefits such as isolation, snapshots, migration 
and restoring of virtual machines. Virtualised deployments are 
thus easier to protect compared to physical servers. Through 
update manager the vital updates can be automatically 
downloaded and applied. 
Cloud computing is still a new technology for SCADA 
[116]. The control and monitoring industry has not yet fully 
embraced cloud computing because it is different to 
conventional IT systems. With further increase in network 
speeds, reliability and storage technologies; SCADA servers 
could be hosted on the cloud infrastructure. The advantages 
would be an easy enforcement of security standards, data 
analytics and disaster recovery. A technology similar to cloud 
that is gradually being adopted by the control industry is 
virtualisation. With a private cloud [101] or virtual 
infrastructure an organization can have the benefits of on-site 
SCADA deployment and the benefits of disaster recovery, 
migration, and high availability. This also ensures keeping the 
data latency to a minimum. 
In future, more open communications standards for 
SCADA systems are expected to be adopted reversing the 
trend where most of the products were closed and proprietary. 
There are open source projects such as, OpenSCADA [117]. 
Although debatable [118] whether better protection is offered 
by a closed system by ‘obscurity’ of its implementation, or an 
open system, where the source is a public domain with a 
possibility for misuse by implementing a targeted attack. In 
the case of open systems, the user community can help by 
providing fixes both before and after vulnerability gets 
exploited through an attack. Such fixes could be quicker as 
there are more people using the system with full knowledge 
with more likelihood to uncover a potential threat.  
The OPC UA (Unified Architecture) is an open industrial 
[120], [121] Machine-to-Machine communication protocol 
that replaced OPC DA. OPC UA is a set of 9 standards, with 
one devoted to security. The general concept is to simplify the 
SCADA communication interface by providing a common 
medium of communication. [119] used OPC communication 
from SCADA systems to collect system data for modelling a 
water distribution network. The data from the OPC server 
could similarly be used to investigate real-time cyber security 
issues by applying data analysis techniques. 
Machine learning and data analytics have now advanced 
and are increasingly being used in new application domains. 
The large data generated [61] in a smart system can be used to 
extract information through data analytics for effective 
management.  Machine learning techniques can be very useful 
for implementing strategies using an anomaly based 
unsupervised detection [11] approach for detecting attacks on 
SCADA systems. Future deployments of SCADA projects 
would see tighter integration between the process data and 
machine learning based data analysis engines observing 
historical data for anomalous behaviour to thwart cyber 
security breaches. 
With industry regulations mandating cyber security for the 
SCADA systems, vendors will provide more built-in security 
features in their systems against cyber-attacks. For example, 
features such as multiplexing proxies 
There is also a lot of ongoing work to improve the 
communications protocols [15] to provide better protection 
against attackers. For example, security was added to DNP3 
protocol by creating its extension called DNPSec [24]. These 
developments are to be seen in the context of emerging IoT or 
smart devices which are now common in SCADA networks. 
There are both benefits and pitfalls to their use with the 
security as the main hurdle to their widespread adoption. IoT 
with its unique IPv6 addresses is both an opportunity and 
challenge for cyber security. 
In future, there will be a need for lot more collaboration 
[42] between researchers, academics, vendors, developers, and 
government agencies to design foolproof solutions through 
integrated and cohesive efforts to meet the security challenges.    
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Category Sub-category Focus Tools used Application Citations 
Simulation 
framework 
SCADASiM Regulatory monitoring ADACS Water supply system [9] 
SCADAsim DDoS, spoofing attacks OMNeT++ Smart meters, wind power 
plant 
[49] 
MAlsim Malware simulation for 
security evaluation 
MAlsim based on JADE Power plant [63] 
Co-simulation Custom smart grid 
component analysis 
CIM, GridLab-D, AKKA, 
EclipseSCADA 
Power system [50] 
Framework Integration of simulations 
and SCADA 
EngSB Software prototype [51] 




Simulation DoS TrueTime 
(MATLAB/Simulink) 
American Gas Association 






Anomaly based detection 
for HMI attack, DoS 
OPNET, PowerWorld, 
ASPS 
Biosphere 2 Power 
Grid at the University of 
Arizona 
[5] 









PowerCyber testbed [59] 
Statistical data 
gathering 
DoS, Data logging Data statistics Power Control 
Systems – Resilience 
Testing Laboratory of 
CESI-RICERCA 
[60] 





DDoS, Network Simulink/Stateflow, HLA, 




Attack DDoS SCADA 2, Modbus 
simulator, GNS3 
Generic implementation [62] 
Virtual machine Modbus TCP/IP, DDoS, 
False data injection  
Common Open Research 
Emulator, Python, 
Pymodbus, Ettercap 




RTUs Snort, Perl, XML Electric substation [35] 
Risk 
assessment 
Probabilistic Risk estimation HMM, IIM, RFRM Generic system [92] 
Modeling Control systems NSRM Oil pipeline pump station [90] 
Network 
vulnerability 
Graph Attack graph Simplified example [94] 
Attack graphs Bayesian network MTTC, CVSS IEEE RTS79 [88] 
Attack trees Vulnerability assessment Vulnerability index Control centre [73] 
TABLE II: SIMULATION AND MODELLING TECHNIQUES WITH THEIR MAIN FOCUS, TOOLS USED, AND APPLICATION.
  
Category Sub-category Focus Tools used Application Citations 
Simulation 
 
Attack trees Intrusion Colored Petri Net SCADA case study [70] 
False sequential 
logic attack 
Intrusion MATLAB/Simulink Three tank system [79] 
Malware attacks Modbus  MAlsim Power plant testbed [24] 
Test bed Modbus TCP OSSIM, Snort, Sebekd, 
OpenVAS 
Simulated PLC [93] 





Graph Modbus ‘C’ Language Tennessee Eastman 
chemical process 
[22] 
Monitoring Malicious commands Real-time and simulation 
monitor 
Water treatment plant [82] 
Attack DDoS OPNET  Hydropower [74] 
Attack Malware injection, 
DoS, MITM 
Netlogo Electrical grid connected 




Mathematical DoS, deception attacks Linear dynamical models Water tank [75] 
Mathematical Model-driven testing Modelica, Eclipse Tank with valves and 
pumps 
[86] 
Game Theory Interactions between 
cyber intruder and 
operator 
Semi network-form game 
(SNFG) 
Distribution feeder line [12] 
Bayesian Networks System survivability SCADASim MITM [87] 
FNN Defence Factor neural network Generic [85] 
Framework, attack 
trees 




Attack trees Modbus/tcp Attack trees Generic system [72] 
Replay attack sensors Analytical, simulation Tenessee Eastman 
problem 
[80] 
False data injection Ac state estimation Analytics  IEEE 57 bus system [77] 
TABLE III: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES WITH THEIR MAIN FOCUS, TOOLS USED AND APPLICATION. 
 
Category subcat Focus Tools Used Application Citations 
Machine 
Learning 









Anomaly detection Telecommunications networks SVM Data sets [98] 





Malware intrusions SVDD, kernel PCA Real data from 
gas pipeline 







Sensor networks [66] 
Communication 
protocols 
DNP3, gray hole attack SVM Trace based 
simulation 
[78] 
Analytics Cloud based data analytics OpenPlanet, Hadoop, 






















SCADA master Hardware, Prime 
replication 
Simple SCADA 









Botnets Detect new botnets honeyd Data traces [112] 
Analysis Protection to SCADA, anti-
honeypot techniques 
Honeywell CDROM Anti-honeypot 
techniques 
[19] 





Code Red, Blaster 
[107] 
Malware Large scale malware collection nepenthes nepenthes [84] 





Email network [113] 
Post attack Forensics Smart grids Traces,  Leurré.com 
system 
Attack attribution [7], [112] 
